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Maple Leaf Zeitgeist?  
Assessing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s First Six Months1 
 
Amelia Hadfield  
 
As Canadian elections go, October 2015 was a stunner. The 43-year old Justin Trudeau, an MP since 
only 2008, led the centrist Liberals to an emphatic victory. After one of the longest election campaigns 
in Canadian history, the new head of the Liberal Party overturned nearly a decade of Conservative 
government under PM Stephen Harper, replacing the Tory majority with the first liberal majority in 15 
years, securing 184 of the 338 districts across the country. Apart from the seemingly endless media 
coverage of the new Prime Minister, in which comparisons ranged from his dynastic inheritance, to a 
glamorous man of the people (or more whimsically the Canadian Robin to US President Obama’s 
Batman), Trudeau now has a number of interesting opportunities. Primarily, his strategy is to reverse a 
range of Tory policies at home, recalibrate Canadian key aspects of foreign policy abroad, and 
ultimately, rehabilitate key aspects of the Canadian national identity. The following article briefly 
explores the impact of Justin Trudeau within all three of these areas in the first half year of his 
premiership.  
Election Tactics  
The 2015 electoral campaign was unusual from the outset. Generally, Canadian campaigns are limited, 
low-key and unevenly managed affairs. This one however ran from August till October, and remained 
high profile throughout, as well as being adeptly stage-managed. Rehabilitating national perceptions of 
the Liberals as Canada’s ‘natural governing party’, and Trudeau himself as an electable leader was key. 
The 2011 election saw Conservative PM Stephen Harper capture a majority of 166 seats in the 308-seat 
House of Commons, squaring off against the New Democratic Party (NDP) as the official opposition. 
Although his public persona had first emerged in 2000 with the oration given at the funeral of his father, 
former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Justin Trudeau only gained serious political attention after 
a decisive win in 2008 as MP for the Montreal suburb of Papineau: an ethnically diverse neighbourhood 
with a more vocal independence movement than the traditional Liberal heartland of west Montreal, 
first cultivated by his father. In earning his electoral stripes, Justin then inherited the mantle of his 
father’s liberal legacy when he slipped swiftly into the driving seat of the Liberal party in April 2013. At 
this point however, the young Trudeau had to  confront the various dimensions of the Trudeau identity: 
his father’s legacy his own political inexperience, and by early 2015, representing both the ‘anyone but 
Harper’ option, and a more electable choice than the NDP.  
 
In managing the election, ‘Team Trudeau’ stuck closely to a range of unrelentingly positive messages. 
This contrasted sharply with Harper’s Conservatives relied on incessant negativism, warning in party 
terms that ‘Voting Liberal will cost you’, and in personal terms that Justin was an ingénue with an 
overblown family background. Reminiscent both of the US elections of President Obama, and the 
current in/out EU Referendum in the UK, the polarizing tactics of ‘hope vs. fear’, ‘experienced vs 
unproven’ were deployed by both sides. Ultimately, the key duality that galvanized Canadians was the 
sense of ‘passion vs dispassion’ emanating from the respective Liberal and Conservative camps. 
Trudeau gradually emerged as the confident source of all things possible, while Harper was increasingly 
portrayed as calculating at best, and opprobrious at worst in his attitudes to domestic and foreign 
affairs.1 The irony that Trudeau was indeed inexperienced enough to represent the ‘anyone’ in the 
‘anyone but Harper’ catchline that typified the final weeks of the campaign was astutely recalibrated 
by his team to represent Justin’s seemingly indefatigable political optimism and personal energy, 
combined with his ability to engage  personally with Canadians.  
 
 
 
                                                                
1 Portions of this article were presented at a conference organised at Université Paris Diderot by Dr Mélanie Torrent, entitled 
‘Asylum, exile and the politics of trans-border solidarity in the contemporary Commonwealth’, on 1 April, 2016.  Thanks are due 
to the insightful feedback received from this conference as well as two reviewers from The Round Table. 
 
Cabinet Canada  
 
In establishing his cabinet, Trudeau’s first reforms as Prime Minster were simple, but effective. He 
opted for a team that is generally young (mostly under 50), ethnically diverse and most notably, 
reflective of gender parity. The result made headlines both locally and internationally. Taken together, 
the 15 men and 15 women Cabinet were chosen to represent ‘a generational change and a commitment 
to reflecting Canada’s diversity’. In practical terms, the result produced a ‘cabinet that looks like 
Canada’. Asked to justify his rationale for his Cabinet composition, Trudeau rattled off a triple word 
score reminiscent of his father’s infamous ‘just watch me’ catchphrase: stating simply, ‘because it’s 
2015.’2 Are these choices therefore genuinely indicative of change, or an astute use of tokenism? 
Former journalist Chrystia Freeland is Minister for International Trade, Maryam Monsef (who 20 years 
ago sought asylum in Canada from Afghanistan) is charged with the democratic reform portfolio, 
alongside three Sikh politicians and two aboriginal MPs, including Jody Wilson Raybould, a former 
Crown prosecutor and First Nations leader from British Columbia. Cabinet newcomers are however 
balanced by the Liberal old guard, including former party leader Stéphane Dion who oversees foreign 
affairs, while Maritime MP Dominic LeBlanc becomes government leader in the House of Commons.3  
 
Lastly, in terms of ministerial authority, Trudeau has attempted to undo the centralizing control 
exercised by the prime minister’s office (PMO) which, under Harper, increasingly dominated the policy 
decisions of his own ministers, and much interaction between government, media, researchers and the 
public in general. Trudeau campaigned hard for a more open and transparent government; his choice 
of cabinet is therefore as instructive as his defiant message that ‘[g]overnment by cabinet is back’.4 
 
Prime Minister Selfie?  
 
Trudeau must now balance stage management and the management of state. From the swearing-in 
ceremony to the Christmas ‘Ottawa Illuminations’, Trudeau, his ministers, and his entourage have 
rejected the customary black  car treatment and security protocol, opting instead to arrive by bus, 
wading into crowds to pose for selfies, and popping up at metro stations and airports (media coverage 
of these events rather unhelpfully refers to Canadians during such event as ‘fans’ rather than citizens). 
Meanwhile, an enhanced engagement is continuing with the media, with Trudeau routinely available 
for journalists in the Parliament’s press theatre, forthcoming in terms of ‘wide-ranging, roundtable 
interviews with the Canadian Press’, and accessible at the range of international forums, from the Malta 
Commonwealth CHOGM in November 2015 to the World Economic Forum annual conference in Davos, 
Switzerland in January 2016.  
 
Is Trudeau’s courtship of the media sharp, or merely showy? There are a variety of answers. In terms 
of projecting himself, Trudeau is clearly attempting to reconstitute not only the Liberal leadership of 
Canada in terms of its inhouse political culture, but remake the ethos of ‘Liberal Canada’ more broadly 
in terms of a national identity. Accordingly, a new and engaging PM who interviewed with American 
Vogue magazine on his first full day in office, followed by a New York Times interview in his completely 
re-furnished office (a smaller desk in the corner allowing everyone to ‘sit down and actually have 
discussions’) suggests a genuineness that has eluded many a Canadian politician in the past (the 
exception perhaps being the former NDP leader Jack Leyton). 2 Questioned about the role of image-
making, Trudeau suggested that media and government both constitute exercises in engagement, in 
that both operate by broadcasting from a given source, with the express purpose of being received by 
a specific audience. Trudeau argues that self-promotion in this sense ‘is really about good democratic 
governance’, arguing that ‘I need people to stay involved and stay engaged and stay positive about 
what we’re doing’.5 From this perspective, image-making may be slick in an instrumental sense, but it 
also ‘represent[s] a two-way contract – giving citizens license to demand better of government and 
Trudeau license to expect better of them’.6 The post-Harper lesson is therefore to avoid the danger of 
disconnect: i.e. appearing not only distant, but also dispassionate. Much like his southern counterpart, 
‘there’s something made-for-social-media about Trudeau’. 7 The risk of course is ‘that it can only end in 
                                                                
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html?_r=0. 
crushing disappointment – that it’s all too good to be true, that there may be little of substance behind 
the slick photo opportunities’. 8  Substance is indeed the issue. Trudeau is still regarded by many 
Canadians as both an heir to the Trudeau name, and a Liberal party maverick, making him a truly 
‘strange kind of poster boy for a more egalitarian Canada’.. To outflank the risk, Trudeau’s choice of 
policies by which to rebuild himself, party, and the country as a whole, is therefore crucial.  
 
Migration Policy: Maple Leaf Zeitgeist  
 
As The Guardian recently pointed out, ‘Canada, land of wholesome outdoor sports and apologizing 
profusely for things that weren’t your fault, is undeniably having a moment.’9 In policy terms, Trudeau 
appears to have plugged at the micro level into a liberal zeitgeist, and at the macro level, tapped a deep 
need for a rehabilitated, post-Conservative Canadian identity. The policy of choice is migration, which 
operates as a barometer of domestic attitudes towards inclusiveness, separates Canada definitively 
from the US in terms of attitudes to multiculturalism, and Europe in terms of practical responses. US 
President Barack Obama has done his level best to instill progressive attitudes regarding the thorny 
issue of economic migrants from Mexico and South America, and asylum policy more generally. 
However, the 2016 Republican electoral campaign, fueled by earlier GOP and Tea Party attitudes have 
together undermined many of Obama’s approaches. The EU too has produced wide-ranging voltas face 
to the unparalleled migration challenges facing the continent, shifting from the humanitarian responses 
by European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in late 
2015, to far more pragmatic attitudes and forbidding policies.  
 
Admittedly, this is not a convenient like-to-like scenario. Canadian geography is both foil and fillip for 
the country’s geopolitical choices and its immigration and asylum policies. Nevertheless, there are stark 
differences between US, European and Canadian responses to external migration pressures and 
domestic Islamist terror attacks,. Foregrounded both by the October 2014 shootouts on Parliament Hill 
and the House of Commons, the Conservative attitude under Harper favored an increase in Canadian 
armed forces operating in US-led anti-ISIS coalitions, matched by tightened immigration and migration 
opportunities, and the proposed ‘Barbaric Cultural Practice’ policy (forbidding the wearing cultural and 
religious garments).  Trudeau favored a reversal of this position, stating that Canada will ‘withdraw 
its six fighter jets from the U.S.-led mission, pledging instead to increase the number of military trainers 
on the ground’.10  
 
Migration has since 2015 been painful topic, when the Harper government had to combat accusations 
that the family of the drowned toddler, Alan Kurdi, washed ashore on a Turkish beach, had originally 
been denied entry into Canada. Migration policy during 2015  ‘stressed security, and seemed cautious’ 
but domestically was perceived as hard-hearted, and ‘not one that made Canadians proud’. As explored 
further at the end of the article, Trudeau has reversed the general tone of Canadian migration policy, 
tapping instead into an image of ‘compassionate Canadians’. This appears both more humanitarian 
abroad, whilst accompanied by voluntarist attitudes locally using ‘refugee sponsorship and 
volunteer[ing] to work in settlement services’. 11 This in turn has enabled the federal government to 
promise Canadian homes to 25,000 Syrians by the end of 2015. Canadian media coverage suggests that 
federal and provincial responses are for the most part aligned in this respect. Leading the humanitarian 
charge by personally welcoming Syrians at Toronto Pearson airport, Trudeau not only scored a personal 
hit, but upped the provincial ante by ‘personally helping refugees into warm coats, while declaring, 
“You’re safe at home now.”’.12  
 
 
Hardened commentators may recoil at such saccharine imagery. The majority of citizens however –
particularly in their ‘local Canadian’ identity have unhesitatingly followed suit, with welcome receptions 
hosted by each of the provincial premiers echoed at airports up and down the country.13 Encouragingly, 
smaller provinces like New Brunswick have for example not only ‘urge[d] Ottawa to expedite funding 
for refuges with children’, but made clear that ‘New Brunswick needs these newcomers as much as 
they need New Brunswick’.14 From this perspective, the Canadian welcome to Syrian migrants appears 
largely well-managed (with a range of sponsorship options enabling entry to Canada) and authentic, 
with Arabic signs, Arabic columns in local newspapers, and halal meat all in increasing evidence.15  
 
 
2016 will likely see the Trudeau government concentrate on the hardware of infrastructure projects 
that can stimulate the economy, and budgetary software that will unroll new tax credits, new 
investment opportunities for SMEs, and incrased taxes for the top 1% of earners, possibly while 
lowering middle-class taxes. In terms of domestic governance, improved legislative mechanisms will be 
required to reverse the ‘unwieldy ‘omnibus’ legislation that bundled together unconnected matters’16 
used by the Conservative government. Elsewhere, more even-handed approaches are needed to 
improve relations between Ottawa and the First Nations, particularly in respect of the specific needs of 
Arctic communities in the High North.   
  
Six months after taking office, Trudeau’s domestic overhauls have yet to prove substantive. Following 
the Harper Conservatives and their ‘image of heard-heartedness, suspicion and cynicism’ is effective 
electorally, but Canadians will demand more, and soon. Collective responsibility driven by the Cabinet 
plus Trudeau’s own leadership will be needed to bolster the unsteady economy, lackluster currency, 
and threat of precipitous job loss (particularly in Alberta with the drop in oil prices).  The Guardian 
perhaps waxes too lyrical in suggesting that ‘while the US boasts of offering its citizens “life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness”, it’s Canada that actually delivers on all three.’17 Possibly, but there is a great 
deal more, from urban child poverty and uneven healthcare provisions, to feeble northern governance 
to which the new government needs to attend. 
 
The Flag and the Backpack: Canadian Abroad  
 
Trudeau appears to have found his groove domestically. But goodness of fit at the global level is equally 
important. The slew of summitry that followed his election in October 2015 including G20, APEC, 
CHOGM, Paris COP21 and  Davos meetings suggest a renewed focus on conflict mediation to tackle 
proximate issues, and multilateralism to deal with more global challenges. As argued by former 
Canadian ambassador to Russia and the EU, Jeremy Kinsman, ‘[i]n terms of broader messaging, 
Canada’s best international brand … has been our ability to manage pluralism, which Trudeau 
articulated impressively, especially for the Commonwealth. Other leaders respect it because many of 
them are sitting on top of powder kegs of sectarian unrest.’ 
 
Canada-US  
 
‘What’s not to like?’ asked President Obama in relation to Justin Trudeau at their first news conference, 
in November 2015.  While genial relations between the US and Canada remain something of a 
continental truism, the reality has differed in recent years. Obama’s relationship with PM Harper was 
strained at the best of times, and bilateral relations on climate change, energy and trade were lthe 
worse for it. Now in full legacy-building mode, and on the prowl for a ‘like-minded champion of liberal 
causes’, Obama may have found just the man in Justin Trudeau.18 No Canadian leader has enjoyed an 
official state visit to Washington in twenty years. Coup indeed for Trudeau not merely to be invited to 
Washington in such estate, but to have appeared simultaneously ‘unabashedly inclusive and outward-
looking’ and the natural heir to global liberal leadership. Replacing Canadian commitments to hard 
power with military training missions and humanitarian aid, as well as ratifying the October 2015 Trans-
Pacific Partnership to lower trade barriers suggest that both leaders generally see eye-to-eye in 
strategic terms, working together to support ‘policies of economic inclusion and diversity’.19 However, 
shared liberal attitudes to trade and foreign policy do not solve everything. The endless softwood 
lumber arguments, differing visions of energy security, and the changed role of Canadian forces in US-
led anti-ISIL ops in Afghanistan and Iraq remain anomalies between the two neighbours.  
 
Commonwealth CHOGM: In November 2015, the heads of Commonwealth states met in Valetta, Malta. 
For Trudeau, this international debut was a vital opportunity to rehabilitate the self-induced isolation 
of Canada within the Commonwealth family after the spat between Secretary General Sharma and PM 
Harper over the location of the 2013 CHOGM in Sri Lanka. At the time, Harper argued that CHOGM’s 
presence in Colombo effectively endorsed Sri Lanka’s inexcusable human rights record; he 
subsequently withdrew $20 million in discretionary funding from its Commonwealth contributions. As 
Canada remains the second-highest Commonwealth contributor after Britain, the blow was a bitter 
one, followed by a two-year nadir in Canada-Commonwealth relations.  
 
At Malta however, Trudeau presented the face of renewal, and managed to score not once but twice. 
First, chosen by his fellow Heads of State to toast Her Majesty the Queen at the banquet concluding 
the first day of the conference, Trudeau deftly paid homage to the Queen’s ‘constant presence in the 
life of Canada since 1935 (when she first appeared on a postage stamp), commending the monarch for 
having ‘seen more of Canada than almost any Canadian’.20  Second, tuning in to Malta’s climate change 
leitmotif, Trudeau announced Canada's sizeable contribution towards an international climate fund 
(comprising $2.65 billion over five years to help developing countries fight climate change).21  
 
As Canadian Commonwealth envoy Hugh Segal argues, in terms of goodness of fit, the new Canadian 
government and the Commonwealth are ideally suited. The Canadian government is now interested in 
a different catalogue: ‘soft power – development, education, human rights, education and all those 
important priorities’, while the Commonwealth remains a fundamentally soft power organisation 
operating as ‘a non-military, soft-power organization with tremendous potential… [and] an important 
instrument for development and reflective of a kinder, gentler approach to foreign policy, which 
appears to be where this government is headed’22. Ironically, dynasty counts for much in both the 
Commonwealth and Canada. Pierre Trudeau himself began as a reluctant Commonwealth supporter. 
However, after hosting the second CHOGM in 1973, he not only ‘succeeded, ever so diplomatically, in 
taking a fusty, overly bureaucratic group by the scruff of the neck and shaking off its dust’ but 
transformed himself into an ardent Commonwealth champion in the process. In this mode, Justin 
Trudeau could perhaps consider the impact of appointing a separate minister for the Commonwealth 
to balance the current minister for La Francophonie (Marie-Claude Bibeau).23 
 
Evergreen: The Politics of Climate Change 
 
The December 2015 COP21 Climate Change Summit in Paris was the next major international foray for 
Trudeau. Despite the prominence of climate change during the election campaign, Canada was not the 
most influential player at Paris in terms of producing mitigation commitments. The media however did 
not appear to notice, chiefly because Trudeau’s green credentials – while unproven – stand in such 
stark contrast to that of his predecessor. Harper’s government after all removed Canada from the Kyoto 
Protocol, angered the EU over carbon reduction policies, and displayed surprisingly robust skepticism 
about global warming in general; a suite of policy choices directly connected to promoting the 
economic and environmental viability of the high-carbon Albertan tar sands. Despite a lack of policy 
detail, Trudeau instead placed himself comprehensively ‘on message’, realigning Canada firmly within 
global CO2 mitigation efforts. This itself was counted as enough in Paris, and at home.  
 
Splashy announcements to work with the EU, the US and China towards emission reductions is one 
thing. But confronting the split personality disorder of a country torn between innovative mitigation 
philosophies (Quebec and British Columbia) and a profound reliance on oil, as with Alberta, and natural 
gas (Eastern Canada) is another. Like the EU Member States, each of the provinces of Canada have 
markedly different environmental profiles and wide-ranging, frequently oppositional policies. On 
climate change – as with migration and security - Trudeau’s international high wire acts will have to 
translate into a sustainable domestic balance if he is to produce an evenhanded, and genuinely 
Canadian response to the COP21 promises made on behalf of the country as a whole.  
  
 
  
 
Canada–EU Relations  
 
The COP21 climate change summit also allowed Trudeau to reconfigure relations with the EU. There 
are similarities on both sides: both are confronting continued fossil fuel reliance in the midst of 
promulgating mitigation strategies; both are reliant on growing free trade deals with key states and 
regions; both count on the soft power impact of working within the structures of global governance, 
and both sides are struggling to consolidate a security and defence identity that can make a practical 
difference to migration and asylum policy. At the heart of the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership lies trade 
and investment. After the initial euphoria of the completed Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the two sides, legal logjams in the form of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms followed, regarded as controversial by Canada (and the US in its current 
TTIP negotiations with the EU) because the provision enables companies to sue governments over 
legislation deemed contrary to investment. The provision is not a new one (it has existed in some 
fashion since the 1950s in upwards of 1,400 trade agreements between the EU and various third 
parties), but it required the EU to rethink, and Canada to reconsider. Still, the final outcome looks 
promising. Announcements in February 2016 by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström saw 
suggested that the EU had made the ISDS structure more transparent, with ‘stricter procedures for 
selecting the arbitrators, an appeal tribunal’, with the European Commission declaring Canada ‘a strong 
partner to substantially reform this important but outdated system’. This neatly placed the onus on 
Canada to support the reforms but to subsequently accept the revamped CETA into which they will be 
devolved (and possibly putting pressure on the US to act similarly).24  
 
Despite such differing messages, getting CETA approved is seen as vital by both sides.  A recent joint 
Canada-EU study found that the agreement ‘could boost Canada’s income by $12 billion annually and 
bilateral trade by 20 percent. Put another way, this is the economic equivalent of adding $1,000 to the 
average Canadian family’s income or almost 80,000 new jobs to the Canadian economy’ (Global Affairs 
Canada, 2016b). Numbers count for much. So do allies. Trudeau voiced his own concerns in this respect, 
arguing…  
 
For Canada, CETA is a key method of delivering on a bipartisan ‘commitment to create jobs, stimulate 
economic growth and sustain long-term prosperity for all Canadians’ (Global Affairs Canada, 2016b). 
For the EU, CETA is the economic counterpart to the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership, a political 
structure that places Canada alongside the US, China, India and even Russia in terms of key east-west 
allies. For his part, Trudeau appears aware of the politics as well as the economics of trade, arguing that 
‘in a world of shifting global power, it is more important than ever to leverage the Canadian-European 
partnership to advance our common values and interests’ (Connolly, 2016).  
 
Im-migration Redux 
 
‘Trudeau is what we thought Canada was’, remarked a US observer recently.25 ” The reconstruction of 
the Canadian political identity appears to have begun, with social media as its medium, and a twofold 
message of enhanced domestic governance, and a responsible  attitude to the international pressures 
of economic immigration and political migration. How these policies will emerge to typify a resurgent 
Canadian identity is still unclear. As observed by former Canadian ambassador Kinsman:  
 
[Trudeau’s] message of welcome for Syrian refugees was a confidence-building boost 
to the pull factor in the refugee dilemma, even if our situation, with the luxury of 
screening candidates from refugee camps, is hardly comparable to the challenges of 
Germany, Sweden, and others inundated by a mass exodus of millions of refugees 
that seems to obey a momentum and logic of its own.26 
 
A welcome attitude to war-wearied migrants is a good start. But Trudeau is more likely to be judged in 
the long-term by the sustainability of his proposed changes to Canadian immigration policy, and the 
promise of a rehabilitated Canadian national identity. Such changes for example include a doubling of 
the number of immigration applications allowed for parents and grand-parents sponsorship (to 10,000 
visas per year), doubling the budget for processing  immigration applications, lifting the 
visa requirement for Mexican travel to Canada, and controversially, restoring free access to healthcare 
for refugee/asylum seekers pending a decision on their case by the government, as well as easing 
restrictions on international students gaining Canadian citizenship.  
 
Trudeau’s response however is not wholly explained by external pressures, but also by the historic 
foregrounding of such attitudes in classic Liberal ideology. In terms of political heritage, the Liberal 
Party of Canada has ‘traditionally been the most sympathetic Canadian political party when it comes to 
the immigration file’. 27  During the 1970s, under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau, the Liberals 
successfully constructed, and then coined official support for the concept of multiculturalism: rendering 
it innately integrative in political terms, and Canadian in cultural terms: 
 
Multiculturalism, in a Canadian context, means integrating newcomers into Canadian 
society without forcing them to shed their own unique identity and culture. This 
progressive stance on multiculturalism helped define Canada as a nation that is 
accepting of immigrants and, not surprisingly, helped win the hearts and minds of 
many new Canadians.28 
 
In practical terms, these and other reforms proposed by Trudeau to reform Canada’s immigration 
system represent not only an enormous identity shift from the previous government’s attitude, but a 
veritable sea change in terms of rehabilitating the Canadian Self by genuinely and permanently 
habilitating a wide variety of international Others.29 Trudeau maintains that openness, plurality and 
inclusiveness applies as equally to the domestic components of the Canadian identity, as for its image 
abroad. In other words, an open Canada is one that is shaped by its multiculturalism, based on shared 
values of respect, compassion, solidarity, and the willingness to work hard. Trudeau has referred to this 
as ‘the first post-national state’. 
 
The danger is that such laudable efforts disintegrate  - along with the deeply personal touch imparted 
by Trudeau himself - into citizenship spin. Open-door migration policies tend to operate with something 
of a shelf-life relative to the original crisis, in either temporal or proximity terms. The Syrian crisis will 
sadly and undoubtedly be replaced by another humanitarian fallout, by it may not be accompanied by 
an equally receptive and instantaneous response from migrant-friendly countries like Canada. Equally, 
overhauled immigration policies take time to bed down, and produce results, specifically at the 
provincial level where the greatest amount of provisions are required.  By which time, another election 
may be looming.  
 
In terms of global governance, the challenge may be even greater. Trudeau has yet to carve out a sharp 
foreign policy agenda for Canada but he must at all costs avoid ineffective, anodyne foreign policies 
premised on the philosophy of ‘less for less’ rather than committing more for more (as the EU has 
learned to its peril). For now, Trudeau has opted for a military drawdown. Few may feel the effects. 
Canada has played a marginal role in its anti-ISIL efforts. It may therefore be logical to replace Canada’s 
venerable six CF- 18s: which as Kinsman argues are ‘statistically incidental to a military success that 
would have to rely on the disparate and frequently competing ground forces from Syria and Iraq’. Better 
perhaps to concentrate on bottom-up, security-sector reforms that rely on expanding the military 
training currently offered by Canada to the Kurdish Peshmurga. Although this – combined with 
enhanced humanitarian aid – constitutes value in a tactical sense, Trudeau has yet to identify the 
strategic contribution of this decision in making it ‘militarily significant’ in the eyes of its allies.30  
 
There is no equivalent to American exceptionalism, north of the 49th parallel. Canadians rely instead on 
tolerance, honesty, and reliability, usually starting from their local community, and working its way up 
in terms of governance. Exceptionalism lies instead in the quality of its citizenship, and its perceived 
ability  - in admittedly simple terms - to simultaneously be good, and do good in the world. With 
Trudeau at the helm, improved and yes – optimistic - governance is a decent start to maintaining high-
quality citizenship, at home and abroad.  
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